an essay on theodicy

Atheist William Rowe presents his evidence for not believing in God in “The Evidential Argument from Evil,” yet in doing so simultaneously defeats his own argument. Rowe believes that God cannot exist if evil exists such that there is no discernible nor imaginable good that can come from such evil. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good, then God would necessarily prevent this kind of evil from occurring. Rowe argues theoretically and practically, and in both he makes arrogant assumptions that destroy his argument.

Rowe begins with the proposition that God is wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient. Rowe’s argument against God’s existence adds another oft-used proposition, that an entity such as God, good, omnipotent, and omniscient, will necessarily prevent every kind of unnecessary evil that occurs in the world. Rowe conveniently tosses out man-made evil, for this kind of evil does not help his argument, and man-made evil does not account for all evil in the world. He also ignores the kind of evil (or suffering) that aids men in producing strength of character. Again, this kind of evil does not help his argument, and as he says, “it’s reasonably clear that suffering often occurs in a degree far beyond what is required for character development” (Rowe, 368). Rowe limits his evil to that which, in his estimation, “could have been prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (Rowe, 366).

Rowe first argues theoretically. There must be some evil, somewhere in creation, that does not bring with it some sort of good. There must exist some evil completely disconnected from any good consequence. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he knows about it and can prevent it. Since he does not prevent this disconnected and fruitless evil, he is not good. Rowe claims that God does not exist because he allows evil to exist, the particular evil that has no purpose.

This theoretical argument appears damning on the surface, but at the surface is where it remains. Philosophers have long created word games that mean nothing in reality: Can God make a rock that he cannot move? The words contain meaning, but when placed together and examined in the context of reality, the actual statement means nothing. The problem of God creating a rock that he cannot move is not a theist problem, but a semantic problem. God “cannot” do many things, including commit sin, for example. In a sense, he is “limited” by his nature. In this rock problem, he is “limited” by the meaning of the words, “cannot” and “move”, but not by any actual limit of his power. Rowe can argue about unnecessary suffering, and he can throw around words like “God”, “omniscient,” “omnipotent,” and “good,” but he has no true idea what they mean, particularly in the biblical context. The God that he refutes does not exist in the first place. Rowe assumes he understands what “good” means, and he assumes that “good,” when applied to men, applies equally and identically in every situation to God, but God is not a man.

God commands men to be good, and yes, he commands men to shun sin (evil) and pursue the welfare of others. God commands men to trust in him and do good (Psalm 37.3, 4), for God created man to glorify him. God’s purpose, however, is not to pursue the good of mankind, but to glorify himself[1]. God uses evil and he uses it frequently[2]. God does not sin, but he uses sin and he uses the destructive forces of nature to accomplish his purpose. Rowe misunderstands both the purpose of men and the purpose of God. God created man to show his glory (Romans 9), and not to bestow temporal and material blessings upon him. Rowe’s argument against God betrays a simplistic and ignorant view of God that many atheists possess.

We see further evidence of Rowe’s overly simplistic caricature of God in the practical illustration of the fawn. If a forest fire catches a fawn, and the fawn is badly injured and dies, no good can possibly come from this. To Rowe, this is “reasonably clear” (Rowe, 368). This example raises many questions about the nature of a universe that Rowe would create if he were omnipotent. Are forest animals never to suffer? Do forest fires not exist in Rowe’s world? Do animals not burn? Does wood not burn? Does fire exist? Does heat not exist? Do we eat raw meat? Do we even eat meat at all in Rowe’s world? If Rowe were God, would he defy the natural laws that he created to run the world and work miracles every time a fawn was threatened with unnecessary and preventable suffering? What kind of nonsense universe does Rowe want to live in? With this meaningless example, Rowe has eliminated a number of basic necessities (fire, meat, heat) that men have used for millennia, simply because he cannot imagine how the death of a forest fawn can have any good connected to it. These necessities provide good for men and women that Rowe’s superficial understanding of the world and God cannot imagine.

Rowe’s fawn illustration contains yet another good that destroys his argument. Rowe fails to see any good that can come from the prolonged agony of a fawn that burns to death in a forest fire. Rowe, however, has taken great pains to craft an argument against the existence of a God that he believes does not exist, and he uses the suffering of the fawn to do this. Rowe’s argument “proves” that God does not exist, therefore removing the lie of this eternal deity, freeing men from the chains of religion, and setting them on a path to truth. Good has come from suffering, and therefore Rowe’s argument is false. The “good” of Rowe’s argument disproves the argument itself, and one more atheistic argument collapses in on itself in a colossal display of irony. Rowe’s failure lies not in his logic, but in his hubris. Rowe fails as has every philosopher since Job.

Rowe and the biblical patriarch Job ask the same question of God: Why is there suffering if you are good? God denies them any sort of justification of his actions. Instead, he questions the audacity that any man would ask the question at all. “Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?” he demands. God silences the question by revealing its arrogance and its assumption of knowledge that only deity can possess. While Job humbly submits to God’s wisdom, Rowe questions the Almighty. Rowe assumes that he understands every possible good that can come from a given situation. Rowe believes that he knows what only God can know. Rowe categorically declares that God does not exist because Rowe cannot see any good that can come from suffering. In order for Rowe to declare that no good can possibly come from suffering of which he cannot imagine or observe any connected good, Rowe must possess exhaustive knowledge of every good connected to every instance of suffering. Rowe must be omniscient. In order for Rowe to question God, he must assume the role of God, yet in doing so, abolishes his own argument.

We naturally question God. In our curiosity, we wonder how God’s goodness can be reconciled with the suffering in creation. In our pride, we disagree with God’s governance of creation and we believe that we could do better. God’s word to Job demonstrates that we have no idea of the magnitude regarding God’s work, his wisdom, and his goodness in managing what he has created. Many philosophers before and since William Rowe have asked the same question of God. Many will continue to ask, but the truly wise, however, will acknowledge their limitations as Job did, and trust in him who created the universe and say,

I know that You can do all things,

And that no purpose of Yours can be thwarted.

‘Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?’

Therefore I have declared that which I did not understand,

Things too wonderful for me, which I did not know.”

‘Hear, now, and I will speak;

I will ask You, and You instruct me.’

“I have heard of You by the hearing of the ear;

But now my eye sees You;

Therefore I retract,

And I repent in dust and ashes.

William Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil” in Philosophy of Religion, editors Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014)

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[1] See Ezekiel 20, where God acts on the behalf of the Israelites not for their sake, but for the sake of “My name”. This theme of God acting so his name will be known and known correctly appears throughout the prophetical books and also in Romans 9.

[2] In the book of Job, which I will discuss later, God assumes full responsibility for the acts of Satan. God allowed Satan to destroy Job’s family and wealth, but he says, “he still holds fast his integrity, although you incited me against him to ruin him” [Job 2.3, emphasis added]. Though Job and his friends blame God repeatedly for Job’s destruction, at no point does God mention Satan or blame chance for what he allowed.